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REGIONAL SECURITY: UNITED STATES
SECURITY INTERESTS AND CONCERNS IN
LATIN AMERICA
NESTOR D. SANCHEZ*
The purpose of this presentation is to share some perceptions
of our interests and problems in Latin America. At no time in re-
cent years has the United States focused more attention on that re-
gion, and this increased attention is fully warranted and long
overdue. The challenges which confront the United States are
enormous, but so are the opportunities for cooperation. Latin
America is an area with which we are intimately joined by virtue of
the common border with Mexico, the Gulf Coast, Puerto Rico and
the Virgin Islands. Those links are more than geographical, how-
ever, for they are based on history, culture, language, trade, invest-
ment and immigration. If Latin American is insecure, the United
States is affected; if Latin America is threatened, we are threatened.
Before discussing perceptions, interests and problems in the re-
gion, it is necessary to address an important and essential facet of
power that is of concern to all of us-national will. The United
States, under the leadership of President Reagan, is determined to
demonstrate a constancy of purpose in its domestic and foreign af-
fairs. We must restore through our action, a credibility which has
been sorely lacking. We intend to assist in the development of a
reasonable division of labor and responsibility among friends and
allies, strengthen our military posture, deter Soviet and Cuban ex-
pansionism and reduce regional sources of instability.
Understandably, there has been criticism directed towards the
disparity between the official expression of commitment to the se-
curity of traditional friends in Latin America and the lack of credi-
bility that has grown in the wake of the Vietnam War. This has
been compounded by the shift in the United States-Soviet power
balance and uncertain political actions, such as the withdrawal of
troops from Indochina, the indecision and vacillation surrounding
our policy toward the withdrawal of United States forces from Ko-
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rea, and the fall of the pro-American government in Iran. This Ad-
ministration is dedicated to meeting and strengthening the global
and regional commitments of the United States. Working with our
friends, we do not intend to allow the Soviet Union, Cuba or any
other Marxist regime to impose its system of government on other
peoples of this hemisphere.
I. GENERAL DEFENSE OBJECTIVES
The primary objective in the Western Hemisphere is to main-
tain the security of the North American Continent, the contiguous
Caribbean Basin and the vital sea and air approaches to the Pan-
ama Canal. To achieve this objective, we must: (1) counter Soviet
and Cuban supported terrorism, military intervention and destabi-
lizing actions in the Caribbean Basin; (2) broaden regional mili-
tary-to-military contacts and seek the active cooperation of the
countries of the region for regional, territorial and air defense of the
Caribbean and South Atlantic sea lines of communication;
(3) maintain, or acquire as needed, operational facilities, transit,
and overflight rights; (4) maintain access to strategic raw materials,
including energy sources and processing facilities; (5) help create a
favorable security environment in which economic, political and
social development can take place in a rational manner; and,
(6) maintain the capability to neutralize Soviet and Cuban military
assets in Cuba and elsewhere in the Caribbean which would im-
pede, in time of war, United States power projection and strategic
retaliation.
This is obviously not going to be an easy task, given the enor-
mous challenge which confronts the region today. Part of the chal-
lenge stems from deeply rooted political, social and economic
problems, which cannot be solved immediately. Their resolution
will require a dedicated, long-term commitment. In addition, these
conditions have been aggravated by Soviet and Cuban destabiliza-
tion efforts. Their ultimate goals have not changed and are
designed to: (1) discredit the United States; (2) obtain a dominant
influence over politico-military developments in the area; (3) assist
like-minded elements within the radical left to obtain power; and,
(4) eventually establish totalitarian governments under their influ-
ence and domination.
Historically, the Soviet Union employed state-to-state rela-
tions, almost exclusively through its diplomatic missions, to further
its objectives in the area. However, following the Sandinista vic-
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tory in Nicaragua, both the Soviet Union and Cuba, convinced that
the times favored the leftist revolutionaries, began to provide more
active support to other revolutionary movements, especially in El
Salvador. Since 1979, the Soviets have supported efforts to collect
funds, arms and supplies from the Communist Bloc and other like-
minded nations for the Salvadorian guerrillas.
II. PARTICULAR SECURITY CONCERNS IN THE CARIBBEAN
BASIN
Soviet presence in Latin America, excluding their diplomatic
missions, consists of approximately ten thousand military and civil-
ian technicians in Cuba, about two hundred military and civilian
specialists and technicians in Peru, and numerous military advisors
in Nicaragua. The Soviets have more military and civilian techni-
cians in Peru alone than the United States has in all of Central and
South America. Yet the Soviets are not the only problem. They
rely principally on Cuba in Latin America since both countries'
objectives closely coincide (at least in the case of Central America).
To shed some light on this problem, it is necessary to discuss the
magnitude of Cuban involvement in Nicaragua, Grenada, Costa
Rica and El Salvador.
A. Nicaragua
Cuba has dedicated itself to the survival of the Sandinista gov-
ernment in Nicaragua and to the continued leftward movement of
that regime. Four to five thousand Cubans have been brought in to
assist, in addition to fifteen hundred military and security advisors
who are directing the formation of intelligence and counterintel-
ligence groups, and assisting the transformation of the Sandinista
guerrilla forces into the largest conventional armed force in Central
America. The Sandinista government is organizing a fifty thousand
man army which is approximately four to five times the size of
Somoza's National Guard. Additionally, the Sandinistas have
plans to form a militia of 250,000.
B. Grenada
In Grenada, Cuba remains the primary supporter of the Mau-
rice Bishop government.' Under increasing Cuban assistance,
1. On March 13, 1979, the government of Grenada, headed by Eric Gairy was ousted
by Maurice Bishop, head of the New Jewel Movement (NJM). NJM considers itself socialis-
Vol. 12
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Prime Minister Bishop has slavishly followed a pro-Soviet foreign
policy line. Cuba has advisors on the island offering military, tech-
nical, security and propaganda assistance to the Bishop govern-
ment, and there are some three hundred Cuban civilian advisors
working largely with Soviet equipment on construction of a new
international airport on the South Coast. Many questions have
been raised concerning the economic justification of the airport
which, with its 9,800 foot runway, will allow the operation of every
aircraft in the Soviet and Cuban inventory.
C Costa Rica
In Costa Rica, while there is no immediate revolutionary
threat, Cuba has been taking advantage of that country's open
democratic society since 1978 to establish and coordinate a covert
network for guerrilla operations elsewhere in Central America. A
minimum of five hundred tons of arms were moved to Costa Rica
from Cuba and elsewhere during the Nicaraguan Civil War, ac-
cording to a report of a special Costa Rican legislative commission
created in June 1980.2 Most important, the commission also esti-
mated that a substantial quantity of these weapons remained in
Costa Rica after the fall of Somoza in July of 1979.
D. El Salvador
El Salvador, of course, is a major focus of Cuban efforts. After
the fall of Somoza, Cuba began intense efforts to help pro-Cuban
guerrillas obtain power in El Salvador by providing overall direc-
tion, planning and support for the insurgents. It has worked closely
with the Soviet Union on international shipment of arms and train-
ing of guerrillas in Cuba and Nicaragua. Guerrilla training in-
creased sharply in 1980 as Cuba concentrated on building an army
able to mount major offensives. A typical three-month training
program included courses in guerrilla tactics, marksmanship and
weapons, field engineering, demolition, field fortifications, land
navigation, and the use of artillery and mines. Also, groups ap-
proaching battalion size (250-500) have been observed receiving in-
struction, suggesting that some Salvadorian guerrillas have been
trained as integral units. Cuba also provides political, organiza-
tic. See Economic and Political Future of the Caribbean 1979." Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Inter-American Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1979) (statement of John A. Bushnell,
Dep. Assist. Sec. of State for Inter-American Affairs.)
2. COSTA RICAN LEG. COMMITTEE, RESOLUTION-ARMS MOVEMENT 6 (1980).
4
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 12, No. 3 [], Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol12/iss3/6
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
tional and propaganda support to the Salvadorian guerrillas. Cu-
ban diplomatic facilities worldwide help guerrilla front groups
with travel arrangements and contacts. The Cuban press agency,
Prensa Latina, handles communications for guerrilla representa-
tives abroad. Cuba and the Soviet Union have pressed communist
parties and radical groups to support the insurgency, both directly
and through solidarity organizations, with propaganda and facili-
ties. With Soviet assistance, Cuba has generated propaganda to
distort the realities of the Salvadorian conflict and the goals of the
revolutionary government junta.
In El Salvador, the events of October 15, 1979 were revolution-
ary. Middle-grade officers deposed the oligarchs and the officers
who supported them, and formed a civilian government with a
broad spectrum of representation to include several communists.
The government's goals are political democracy, land reform and
nationalization of the banks. The difficulty was that this developed
in a country where a few families had ruled for generations. Fol-
lowing the revolution, the old ruling class and extreme right army
generals went into exile, where they organized death squads and
assassination teams to kill those Salvadorians supporting the junta
and implementing reforms. At the same time, communist leaders
met in Havana and agreed on a unified military organization to
fight the revolutionary government. Thus, the junta is beset with
violent opposition from the extreme right and extreme left. The
counterrevolutionary strategy of the left is to force the government
into violent reaction and exploit this through a widespread and effi-
cient propaganda network. Therefore, in El Salvador, there is 4
moderate revolution under violent attack from two small groups of
extremists who are killing people and destroying the country's
infrastructure.
Moreover, these facts are being twisted in a highly efficient
manner through the use of a sophisticated worldwide disinforma-
tion campaign by the Soviets and their Cuban surrogates to under-
mine the United States and other governments that are not pro-
Soviet. Often, seemingly isolated demonstrations and protests
throughout the world are linked by a common purpose.
These Soviet and Cuban activities pose serious problems for
the United States and its Latin American friends. The United
States has a vital interest in maintaining the security of the Carib-
bean Basin sea lines of communication, through which pass ap-
proximately 45 percent of our crude oil imports, and through which
Vol. 12
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would move 50 percent of the military supplies for the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in time of war. Since 1975,
Cuba has conducted a massive arms buildup. The strength of its
armed forces is second only to Brazil which has eleven times more
people. Recently Cuba received a Soviet Koni class frigate, Mig 23
fighters and Foxtrot submarines. In 1981, military shipments from
the Soviet Union increased dramatically to over sixty-six thousand
tons. Cuba's massive arms buildup poses a threat to our ability to
keep the Caribbean sea lines of communication open in wartime,
and if Grenada were to become a Cuban staging area, the threat
would be compounded. Similarly, the Panama Canal continues to
be a vital and integral part of the Caribbean Pacific sea lines of
communication. Its closure would eliminate the principal transit
route between the Pacific and the North Atlantic.
III. LONG-TERM SECURITY OBJECTIVES
It is important to note that the Caribbean Basin is not the only
concern. We also have significant security interests on the East
Coast of South America and its contiguous waters. The South At-
lantic sea lines of communication carry some two-thirds of West
Europe's petroleum and nearly half the oil imported to the United
States. In 1970, Soviet naval vessels spent approximately two hun-
dred ship days in the South Atlantic. In 1980, its ship days in-
creased to about 2,600. This thirteen-fold increase has given the
Soviets the potential to threaten these vital western sea lanes.
The United States also has important security interests on the
West Coast of South America and its adjacent waters. This sub-
region would take on vastly increased significance if the Panama
Canal were closed or shipping through the canal slowed.
We recognize that the best way to further our security interests
in Latin America is through long-term economic, social and polit-
ical development. However, we must also recognize that this will
take time and cannot take place without a sense of security which is
a fundamental precondition for such development. That sense of
security is currently lacking, particularly in Central America.
To achieve our objectives, a number of difficult steps will have
to be taken. One Administration spokesman summed things up
rather well with the following observations. First, the politics of
Latin America, the alternatives to existing governments, the degree
and type of assistance and the time that would be required to im-
prove the lives and expand the liberties of the people should be
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thought about more realistically. The choices are frequently unat-
tractive. Second, the impact of various alternatives on the security
of the United States and on the autonomy of the other nations of
the hemisphere should be assessed realistically. Third, the globalist
approach which has denied the realities of culture, character, geog-
raphy, economics and history should be abandoned and replaced
with a foreign policy that builds on concrete circumstances.
The preceding goals clearly require ample resources. In addi-
•tion to the necessity for national will to resist aggression, there must
exist the military capability to respond to a wide range of possible
scenarios. To ensure stability, the United States must be prepared
to sacrifice in terms of increased resources. Also, it cannot provide
these resources alone; therefore, it must seek the support of friends
and allies to share the burden for the defense of the West. It should
be stressed that this effort must be performed on a long-term basis.
Security interests demand that current attention must not be a tem-
porary aberration, which has, all to often, been the fact in the past.
This interest and commitment must be sustained.
IV. ARMS TRANSFERS
One element of this commitment involves security assistance,
which has been one of the poor stepchildren in our outlook on de-
fense. This has been a grievous error. A quick look at our geostra-
tegic position vis-a-vis our Soviet adversaries indicates that it has
been very costly to our nation's defenses.
The rationale for the new conventional arms transfer policy of
the Reagan Administration is simple: "The United States cannot
defend the free world's interests alone." Unfortunately, there are
those in the United States and abroad who dispute that conclusion
and its implications.
There are those who believe, or say they do, that the free world
does not need defending. The Soviet threat is merely a figment of
our defense partners' imaginations and a product of our own
hyper-sensitivity. They do not dispute the size of the Soviet mili-
tary build-up. They simply argue that the build-up is a response to
our defense structure or to longstanding fears of inferiority or his-
tory-based paranoia. In essence, it is argued that if only we would
give up our efforts to defend our interests, the Soviet Union would
give up its efforts to destroy our interests.
Such logic leads to some bizzarre conclusions. For example, it
leads to the conclusion that the reason the Soviet army is in Af-
Vol. 12
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ghanistan is to protect the Soviet Union from United States imperi-
alism. Indeed, one prominent South Asian leader recently accused
the United States of preventing the Soviets from withdrawing from
Afghanistan.
At the same time there are Americans who address the ques-
tion differently. In an exemplary display of evenhandedness, they
refuse to make value judgements on either side of the dispute.
They fail to condemn their own country and avoid praising the So-
viet Union. This group begins with the simple assumption that
both the Free World and the Communist World are overburdened
with unnecessary arms. They insist that if the Free World nations
disarm, the Communist World would follow their lead. If the Sovi-
ets will not disarm first, the United States should take the unilateral
initiative to do so. Someone must set the example.
This is an interesting proposition. It speaks to the courage of
the United States and offers the opportunity to show real sincerity
when declaring the desire for a world at peace. Regrettably, histor-
ical evidence points to a different world reality. Ten years ago, the
Nixon Administration unilaterally stopped developing and stock-
piling biological weapons. The Soviets, however, continued pre-
paring for offensive chemical and biological warfare. There is
tragic evidence that the Soviet Union or its surrogates have already
developed these weapons to include "yellow rain" mycotoxins, and
are using biological weapons today in Afghanistan, Laos, and
Cambodia. So much for unilateral disarmament.
Other concerned groups advocate withholding the foreign sale
of weapons arguing that the resources of other countries would be
better spent on internal development needs. However, it has been
consistently demonstrated that the countries of Latin America and
elsewhere are going to satisfy what they consider to be their legiti-
mate defense needs, whether it be from the United States or other
supplier countries. A major case in point is our policy decision in
the 1960s not to sell the F-5 aircraft to any Latin American coun-
tries. This resulted in the introduction of higher performance
French and Soviet aircrafts, and a variety of other third country
aircrafts. Our restraint did not even delay their arrival. It only suc-
ceeded in weakening United States' security relationships with an
area of vital interest to us.
Such policies have also motivated the development of indige-
nous defense industries in Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Their lead-
ers decided that if the United States could not be depended on as a
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reliable source of arms, equipment and training, then the best alter-
native was to become as independent as possible. Fortunately, the
indigenous arms industries are not necessarily detrimental in that
they open opportunities for cooperation and standardization
through co-production.
There are also those who assert that the way to secure freedom
and to forestall communist in-roads into the Third World is to help
eliminate the underlying conditions that make communism attrac-
tive. Instead of arming our friends, we should feed them and im-
prove their quality of life. However, this can only occur in an
environment of stability and security. Communism is not chosen; it
is imposed. It is imposed on those nations which lack the strength
to defend themselves and which lack the protective umbrella of
other free countries. It is remarkable that those who insist that the
United States has vast responsibilities toward the social and eco-
nomic well-being of others are prepared to be equally adamant
against assisting countries in defending against external aggression.
Finally, there are those who say, "Yes, I agree in principle with
providing security assistance, but in practice, we are extending it to
governments that do not measure up to our moral standards, which
is not good." We saw reflections of such conviction in the policy of
the previous administration which was anchored on a universalistic
view of human rights; a view which owed more to theology than to
reality.
This Administration and the Department of Defense are com-
mitted to human rights also. Let there be no doubt. Upon assum-
ing my duties with the Department of Defense, I was struck by the
commitment to human rights by our uniformed members. These
are the men and women who have risked their lives throughout the
world to preserve human rights; not in the abstract, but in very
practical real terms. While striving to improve human rights and
human dignity, we must, as realists, recognize that sometimes we
are faced with a choice among imperfect alternatives. For instance,
while the Thieu Regime in South Vietnam left much to be desired,
it was far superior to what has replaced it. There were no boat pe-
ople fleeing South Vietnam during the war, even at the height of
the bombing. In tiny Cambodia, following the so-called liberation,
more people may have died than were killed on all sides through-
out Indochina in thirteen years of war.
The Shah of Iran is another example. Several human rights
organizations have observed that the situation under the present
Vol. 12
9
Sanchez: Regional Security: United States Security Interests and Concerns
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
REGIONAL SECURITY
regime is substantially worse than pre-revolutionary Iran. Under
the so-called Breshnev Doctrine,3 once a state has become commu-
nistic, its people have no right to select a different system. More-
over, Moscow claims a legal right to repress them if such an
attempt is made.
Our own experience has shown that when we try to translate
morality into foreign policy, the standards involved often tend to be
a little ambiguous, highly subjective and unworkable. For exam-
ple, Hanoi's penchant for conducting wholesale slaughter through-
out Southeast Asia has been seen as a post-war aberration brought
on by nervous excitement; while El Salvador's efforts to institute
agrarian reform, nourish pluralism and elect a government do not
quite measure up. The United States has focused concern on the
failings of friends and has not given sufficient thought to the conse-
quences of our adversaries gaining power.
Let us look now at what we are providing in security assistance
to this vital region. The foreign military sales credit allocation to
Latin America for fiscal year 1981 was $33.3 million-1 percent of
the worldwide total. Latin America is not only at the bottom of our
regional priorities; we are also not offering these countries any real
bargain because these credits have a minimum impact on the
United States budget. These guaranteed loans are negotiated at the
same rate of interest as those which the United States Government
must pay on the commercial market. Moreover, they are used to
purchase goods and services from the United States. Security
assistance in all its forms has a vital role to play in furthering our
national ojectives and should be employed as a key asset in further-
ing our security interests.
This Administration has begun to redress many of the errors of
the past, but much more is needed. In the area of security assist-
ance, for example, we have requested $81.5 million in foreign mili-
tary sales credits for fiscal year 1982, of which we hope at least
$15.5 million will be in the form of grants or concessional credits.
Even this increase will amount to less than 2 percent of the world-
wide total.
The most recent significant development affecting Latin
3. Breshnev Doctrine: States in the Soviet sphere of influence possess "limited sover-
eignty" and are subject to Soviet intervention when the socialist systems of these countries
are threatened. See Baroch, The Breshnev Doctrine, 57 A.B.A. J. 686 (July, 1971).
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America was the Caribbean Basin Initiative.4 In July, 1981, Ca-
nada, Mexico and Venezuela joined with the United States at Nas-
sau to pledge themselves to a cooperative effort to promote the
development of the Caribbean Basin. Meetings of the "Nassau
Four" have been followed by multilateral and bilateral consulta-
tions with the basin countries and others. Our security assistance
will compliment this important economic initiative. It is our firm
belief that improved economic health in the area is essential to
western security.
In Central America, the majority of assistance has been
targeted towards increasing economic vitality and developing a de-
fensive capability against externally supported insurgencies. To
date, the limited United States assistance to El Salvador has ena-
bled the moderate revolutionary junta to resist the radical left ex-
tremists and curb attacks from the far right. Modest training
assistance to the Central American countries will increase their ca-
pability to patrol their borders and interdict illegal arms traffic to
insurgent groups. Without these programs, the United States will
surely incur greater future costs to maintain the security of our in-
creasingly vulnerable southern flank.
As for our overall arms transfer policy, the United States is
committed, both by long-standing policy and by the Rio Treaty, to
join with our Latin American allies in "mutual assistance and com-
mon defense of the American Republics." In the President's words,
the United States "will accord high priority to requests from its ma-
jor alliance partners and to those nations with whom it has friendly
and cooperative security relationships." We are also committed to
pursue that objective prudently, with full regard for the guidelines
and caveats established by legislation and in President Reagan's di-
rective itself. Latin America traditionally has not been a heavily
armed region of the world. With the exception of Cuba, it is not
heavily armed today. Military expenditures were only 1.6 percent
of the region's gross national product (GNP), and only 10.2 percent
of central government expenditures from 1976 to 1978. Com-
parable figures for the developing world, as a whole, are more than
5 percent of GNP and more than 20 percent of government expend-
itures. Latin America's arms imports from 1976 to 1978 were only
7 percent of all developing countries' arms imports. United States
arms sales to Latin America constitute only about 2 percent of our
4. Joint communique between Canada, Mexico, United States, and Venezuela on Car-
ibbean Basin Development, Jul. 11, 1981. See 81 DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 68 (Sept. 1981).
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arms sales worldwide, and only about 3 percent of our sales to de-
veloping countries.
In making its arms transfer decisions, this Administration will
try to avoid telling the Latin Americans what is in their best inter-
est. We believe they can decide that for themselves, especially
when free of outside pressures and intervention. We will instead
concentrate on determining what is in our interest concerning the
security and economic development of the region, the political sta-
bility and reduction of international tensions and the furtherance of
basic human rights.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The foregoing are examples of the initiatives this Administra-
tion has undertaken to revise past policies and respond to current
challenges. More still needs to be done, however, and some specific
recommendations are offered. First, remove the Congressional
constraints on sales to friendly governments by reexamining, and
where appropriate, lifting the prohibitions. At the present time, we
are prevented in some cases from selling them any articles of mili-
tary equipment, including such safety related items as pilot ejection
cartridges for the planes we sold them previously. In the case of
Argentina and Chile, we cannot even permit them to finance the
attendance of their students at our professional military education
courses and, thereby, let them experience first hand our system and
values. Second, provide grant assistance or, at a minimum, conces-
sionary military assistance to strategically important, friendly
countries which have a demonstrated need, particularly in the Car-
ibbean Basin. Third, implement multiyear military planning and
financing to insure security. Fourth, revise the Congressional pro-
hibition on security assistance to constabulary forces. Many of the
small states of the Caribbean do not have armed forces and the
constabulary forces must fulfill the security function. Fifth, in-
crease the amount of grant training or International Military Edu-
cation Training (IMET).5 We have, through a variety of cutbacks
and restictions in IMET, virtually lost our influence with an entire
5. IMET enables the United States to maintain contact and influence with junior of-
ficers who will be the future leaders of Latin America; regarded as "the most important
security assistance program in Latin America." See Foreign Assistance Legislationfor FY
1982 (part 7). Hearings Before the Subcommt on Inter-American Affairs,-96th Cong., 1st Sess.
12 (1980) (statement of Franklin D. Kramer, Prin. Dep. Assist. Sec. of Defense on Interna-
tional Security Affairs).
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generation of Latin American officers. There is no better way to
spend our money than by bringing these officers to the United
States to experience first hand our goals, aspirations and training.
We no longer have the luxury of using Latin America as a test
bed for social experiments with the objective of modeling the re-
gion in our own image. The stakes are simply too high. Our policy
must build on concrete circumstances and we must think realisti-
cally about what can and cannot be done, while at the same time
assessing the impact of various alternatives on the security of our
country.
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, it is extremely important that our current atten-
tion to Latin America continue over the long range. It cannot be
merely another surge which has too often characterized our policy
toward the region in the past. Similarly, this is a most imperfect
world and some of the political, economic and social problems will
never be solved to everyone's satisfaction. Yet, we cannot give up.
We must undertake a long range commitment to improve the
deeply rooted political, economic and social imbalance. In addi-
tion, while the best way to further our vital security interests within
the hemisphere is through long term political, economic and social
development, we must recognize that this cannot take place without
a sense of security-a fundamental precondition for such develop-
ment. The Soviets and Cubans are dedicated to undermining that
sense of security through their export of terrorism and subversion.
This must be stopped. Moreover, security assistance, while not the
principle element in our policy toward the region, is an essential
component.
Finally, there exists within this hemisphere immense agricul-
tural, mineral, technological and human resources in sufficient
quantities to sustain a very comfortable level of life for all of its
people. Have we not overlooked this potential in the past? Cer-
tainly, there is ample reason for sharply raising the priority which
we attach to this region of vital United States interest, for unless we
devote more attention to hemispheric security, all of our peoples
are threatened. The United States, in cooperation with our friends,
can reverse the Soviet and Cuban intervention and attempts to es-
tablish communist regimes. Maybe this is the sort of cooperation
which Simon Bolivar had a glimpse of when he exhorted in Angos-
tura in 1819, "Unity, unity, unity must be our motto in all things."
Vol. 12
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